

International Law Studies—Volume 21

International Law Documents

forming an impression of the views entertained by the delegations on this matter. The American delegation was entirely willing to accept instead of 90,000 tons, proposed as the maximum limit for the United States, 60,000 tons, thus scrapping 35,000 tons of the existing submarine tonnage, on the basis that Great Britain should also accept 60,000 tons as the maximum limit of submarines and scrap 22,464 tons, her present amount of submarine tonnage being 82,464 tons, according to the American figures. Then, in a desire to make whatever accommodation was possible to meet the views entertained by the other delegations, the chairman suggested that if the United States and Great Britain each reduced the maximum limit of their submarine tonnage to 60,000 tons, France, Japan, and Italy should retain the tonnage they have—in other words, maintain the status quo as regards submarine tonnage. He made the suggestion in order to show that so far as the American Government was concerned it was not in favor of anything that savored of expansion. This was a conference on limitation.

In reply to an inquiry by Lord Lee the chairman said that he understood that the present submarine tonnage of Japan was 31,452 tons; that of France, according to the figures given the other day, was 31,391 tons, and that of Italy somewhat less—about 21,000 tons.

The meeting then adjourned until 3.30 p. m., December 24, 1921.

---

**EIGHTH MEETING, COLUMBUS ROOM, PAN AMERICAN UNION BUILDING, SATURDAY, DECEMBER 24, 1921, 3 P. M.**

**PRESENT.**

United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz.

British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield. (For Canada), Sir Robert Borden. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark. (For Australia), Senator Pearce. (For New Zealand), Sir John Salmond. (For India), Mr. Sastri, Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Captain Little, Captain Domville, Mr. Christie.

France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Captain Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot.

Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Polandi Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.

Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Captain Uyeda. Accompanied by Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori.

The Secretary General, Assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Wilson; Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, Interpreters.

1. The eighth meeting of the Committee on Limitation of Armament was held in the Columbus Room of the Pan American Union Building at 3 p. m. Saturday, December 24, 1921.

2. There were present for the United States, Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Col. Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz; for the British Empire, Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India); for France, Mr. Sarraut, Mr. Jusserand, Vice Admiral de Bon; for Italy, Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton; for Japan, Prince Tokugawa, Mr. Hanihara, Vice Admiral Kato, Capt. Uyeda.

3. The following secretaries and technical advisers were present: For the United States, Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark; for the British Empire, Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Christie; for France, Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot; for Italy, Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco; for Japan, Mr. Ichihashi, Commander Hori.

The secretary general, assisted by Mr. Cresson and Mr. Wilson, was present. Mr. Camerlynck and Mr. Talamon, interpreters, were present.

4. The chairman (Mr. Hughes) said that the committee would now proceed from the point reached in the discussion before the recess, when he had modified the American proposals concerning submarine tonnage.

Mr. Balfour stated that in so far as the British delegation was concerned they accepted the proposal as set forth by the chairman.

Admiral de Bon said that he had on the previous day explained that a submarine force composed of 90 boats only corresponded to 15 to 20 units ready for action. This, he said, was a minimum limit for a submarine fleet and was in no way to be considered a figure of speech. To speak, therefore, of reducing the French force below this limit was equivalent to abolishing the whole French program and opening a door to a fresh discussion of the whole problem considered that morning. The new figures proposed were so far below those contemplated by the French instructions that the French delegation was unable to accept them and must refer the whole matter to their Government.



Senator Schanzer said that his colleagues were acquainted with the principles upon which, according to his opinion, the solution of the problem of naval armaments must be based. These principles had been laid down ever since the first meeting of the committee; they had been accepted and could not be departed from even to-day.

These principles were the parity of the Italian fleet with all other large neighboring fleets and the reduction of naval armaments to the quantity strictly necessary for a defensive naval policy.

The above principles had been applied in regard to capital ships; they must also be applied with regard to the other categories of naval armament.

He added that, in view of the entirely special conditions of Italy's maritime position, she could claim, without being accused of advancing excessive demands, an even greater proportion with regard to categories other than capital ships, such as submarines and light craft.

He appealed to the explanations which Mr. Balfour himself had made yesterday in his eloquent speech in reference to Italy's almost insular geographical situation, in consequence of which she depended on the sea for her supply of food and of the most indispensable of her raw materials, and the extent of whose coasts exceeded by far that of all other countries in the Mediterranean.

It was also true that the conditions of her submarine flotilla were absolutely insufficient from a technical point of view.

Despite the limited field of operations in the Adriatic Sea and the proximity of the enemy's naval bases to her own (roughly 100 miles), Italy found during the war that her submarines were insufficient, both with regard to their field of action and to their habitableness; in other words, they were too small for efficient use, and Italy was indebted to the cooperation of French and British submarines for having been able successfully to meet the situation.

Since the armistice Italy had demolished as many as 30 submarines; she was actually left with 43 units in active service and 4 under construction, the total amounting to 20,250 tons.

Only 10 of the first units could be considered of any utility, since they were of more than 700 tons displacement; the others would have to be successively replaced. Although some naval technical authorities in Italy believed that the allotment of submarine tonnage should not necessarily be proportionate to that of capital ships, and that the quota of 31,500 tons for submarines corresponding to the American proposal of a tonnage of 175,000 in capital ships was not sufficient, the Italian delegation was ready in the interest of reduction of armaments to accept this amount upon the condition of parity with France.

The principle of parity had been fully accepted by France, and Senator Schanzer took this occasion to observe that the friendly attitude of the allied nations would greatly contribute to strengthen the cordial relations of friendship between France and Italy which constituted one of the principal guarantees of peace in Europe.

The Italian delegation were convinced on the other hand that, considering the particular conditions which had been pointed out, the chairman would have no difficulty in agreeing that the total tonnage of Italian submarines should be fixed at the above-mentioned limit of 31,500 tons, on the well-understood condition that the same limit should be accepted by the neighboring nation.

Concerning this point they had precise and categorical instructions from their Government.

The chairman stated that Senator Schanzer's suggestion was entirely acceptable. The situation now appeared to stand as follows: The United States of America and Great Britain were willing to accept as a maximum for submarine tonnage the figure of 60,000 tons. The French delegation was not able to formulate its demands, and would not be able to do so until they received instructions from their Government. The Italian delegation was willing to accept 31,500 tons as a maximum, providing that Italy was put on a parity with France.

Mr. Hanihara then said the Japanese delegation had been profoundly impressed by the able and powerful arguments of their most esteemed British colleagues against submarines which it had been not only a privilege but an inspiration to listen to. And yet the Japanese delegation was unable, he had to confess, to convince itself that the submarine was not an effective and necessary weapon of defense.

The Japanese delegation hoped that it had made clear, at the time when the provisional agreement was reached between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan on the question of the capital ship ratio, that the acceptance by Japan of the ratio of 5:5:3 meant for Japan a considerable sacrifice. Yet, because of her desire to contribute toward the achievement of the great object for which the conference had been called, Japan finally accepted the said ratio under various great difficulties. In the same manner Japan was prepared to accept the same ratio in regard to submarines. That would have given Japan 54,000 tons. So far as Japan is concerned this figure was considered as the minimum of submarine tonnage with which the insular position of Japan could be adequately defended.

The new proposal was to allow the United States and Great Britain 60,000 tons each, while France, Italy, and Japan were to maintain the status quo in regard to their respective submarine tonnage. In other words, under this new plan, Japan would be



allowed to have only 31,000 tons. That was considered by the Japanese delegation to be wholly inadequate for Japan's defensive purposes.

The Japanese delegation, therefore, felt constrained to insist upon the assignment of the tonnage proposed in the original American project, i. e., 54,000 tons of submarines.

Without wishing for a moment to debate or to call in question any part of the arguments so ably and so eloquently presented by the various delegates, Mr. Hanihara hoped that he might be permitted to point out that this demand on the part of Japan was actuated solely by consideration of defense. Japan was geographically so remotely situated that it must be evident to all that her submarines could not constitute a menace to any nation.

The chairman said he did not know whether it would be possible to make further progress that afternoon, in view of the fact that it was necessary for the committee to hear first from their French colleagues regarding the proposals which had been made. That matter had first to be cleared up. Their Japanese colleagues still asked for 54,000 tons, even in face of the American and British reduction from 90,000 to 60,000 tons. The situation, he believed, had been clarified as far as possible at the present meeting. He asked whether further discussion was desired; unless so desired, he proposed postponing the matter until Monday or Tuesday.

Mr. Balfour then said that as the committee appeared to be at the end of their day's program he would like to ask the chairman and his colleagues whether a technical examination should not be initiated of the system of naval tons and the measurement of tonnage. He had been brought to make this suggestion by a discovery, made somewhat late in the day, that although there had been much talk of "tons," different nations did not always mean the same thing. The United States had one method of measurement, the British another, the French a third, the Italians a fourth, and the Japanese a fifth. He did not say that it mattered very much in ordinary circumstances which system of tonnage was employed; but now that international arrangements were being made for the future he thought it eminently desirable and almost indispensable to settle two questions. First, to decide the system of measurement of tons for incorporation in the treaty; and, second, to adopt a system which could be measured without difficulty and, above all, without any international misunderstanding as to its precise meaning. Nothing could be more unfortunate than a controversy arising as to what ton was intended, how the measurement was to be made, and whether the measurement had been properly and honestly reached. He suggested this question might with advantage be referred to technical experts. Although he believed that this

matter was outside the range of thought of the ordinary naval officer, yet he believed that among the various delegations people could be found who could reach a proper conclusion. This would be a fitting corollary to the labors of the conference, which in many respects had already been brought to a satisfactory conclusion. Whether the total tonnage should be a multiple of that of the largest ship he did not venture to say, but he thought all would agree that to establish exactly what a ton meant must be desirable. How this inquiry, if approved, should be carried out he would gladly leave to the discretion of the chairman.

The chairman said that the matter of tonnage had already been informally discussed; the British, with their legend ton, according to Mr. Balfour, came within 4 or 5 per cent of the American ton, and Admiral Kato had said that the Japanese ton was even closer to the British than the American. The chairman said he thought the suggestion of great importance; while the difference was not great, the method of arriving at the calculation was the question on which it was necessary to agree. He suggested that a subcommittee of experts should determine upon the standard ton. If it were agreeable to the committee, he would suggest that each of the delegations appoint two naval experts for the purpose of arriving at a definite conclusion in this matter. This procedure was agreed to and the following subcommittee on naval tonnage was named:

United States: Admiral Taylor, Admiral Pratt.

British Empire: Rear Admiral Sir Ernle Chatfield, Instruction Commander Stanton.

France: Capitaine de Vaisseau Frochot, Capitaine de Vaisseau Dupuy-Dutemps.

Italy: Vice Admiral Baron Acton, Commander Prince Fabrizio Ruspoli.

Japan: Vice Admiral Yamanashi, Lieut. Commander Taji.

Mr. Sarraut stated that, in view of the fact that the new American proposal contemplated a considerable reduction in the submarine tonnage which appeared necessary to the French Government, the French delegation could not do otherwise than await instruction.

The chairman said that it was so important to have full deliberation with respect to the matters raised that he wished in no way unduly to hasten the matter. Moreover, unless it was certain some useful work could be done, it would be better to take a holiday, in order not to subject the members of the committee to possible unnecessary inconvenience. An adjournment until Tuesday morning seemed in order, and he would set the time of the next meeting for Tuesday, December 27, 1921, at 11 a. m.



Mr. Sarraut said that before adjourning he wished to refer to one more matter—the delegates were well aware that all were subject to the solicitations of the press in the very natural desire of these gentlemen to be fully informed with respect to the news of the conference. The French delegation deemed it their duty to revise the somewhat copious report of the last sessions before publishing the same. He then asked whether the secretary general would not be the proper person to charge with transmitting the texts which the delegations might desire to have published.

The chairman said that an important distinction must be observed between what was stated outside to newspaper men and that which concerned the communiqué. The former lay in the discretion of the delegates; the latter was an official statement, an abstract of what had passed, subject to the discretion of the committee. In order that each delegation might be correctly represented, he assumed that the secretary general arranged for a revision of their remarks in order that the statements of their official communiqué might be deemed accurate. This seemed to be entirely in accord with Mr. Sarraut's desire.

The other delegations formally agreed to the above.

The chairman added that it was not his intention to confine to the secretary general the statements to be given out. The delegations were free to give out what they wished privately, but the official statements issued by the secretary general must above all assure accuracy and completeness, with the aid of the secretaries of the various delegations. The chairman asked for comments upon the above, but no remarks were made.

The meeting then adjourned until Tuesday, December 27, 1921, at 11 a. m.

---

#### NINTH MEETING—WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 28, 1921, 11 A. M.

##### PRESENT.

*United States.*—Mr. Hughes, Senator Lodge, Mr. Root, Senator Underwood, Colonel Roosevelt, Admiral Coontz. Accompanied by Mr. Wright, Mr. Clark.

*British Empire.*—Mr. Balfour, Lord Lee, Sir Auckland Geddes, Rear Admiral Sir E. Chatfield, Sir Robert Borden (for Canada), Senator Pearce (for Australia), Sir John Salmond (for New Zealand), Mr. Sastri (for India). Accompanied by Sir Maurice Hankey, Capt. Little, Capt. Domville, Mr. Knowles.

*France.*—Mr. Sarraut, Vice Admiral de Bon. Accompanied by Mr. Kammerer, Mr. Denaint, Capt. Odend'hal, Mr. Ponsot.

*Italy.*—Senator Schanzer, Senator Rolandi-Ricci, Senator Albertini, Vice Admiral Baron Acton. Accompanied by Marquis Visconti-Venosta, Count Pagliano, Commander Prince Ruspoli, Mr. Celesia di Vegliasco.